

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Language and Culture

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ABSTRACT

This work focuses on the relation between language and culture from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The focus is not on how the meanings of words and sentences of a language is dependent on the culture of the language users; but how an understanding of the notions of meaning and language can be a basis of an understanding of culture. To do this I will start by discussing why the study of language and its meaning is so vital in philosophy for Wittgenstein. This will require the understanding of Wittgenstein's ideas on language and meaning. I will outline Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and meaning. Then, a discussion on the connection of this conception of language and meaning with culture will follow. I will conclude this work by giving the nature and meaning of culture which can be derived from the understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Language-game, Language, Culture, Philosophy of Language.

INTRODUCTION

Language comprises the most important part of Wittgenstein's philosophy because of the reason that philosophical problems arise from the misuse or misunderstanding of the nature of our language. For him, philosophy is a struggle against the working of our language and how we understand them (Mercer 2002). One of the problems is that we tend to find meaning of a word or sentence outside its natural place and ask the meaning independent of how the word or sentence is actually used. Where we actually use a language and the meaning is in our everyday language which is its home. In philosophy we are stuck in the rules which we made, and this

made us captives. So, the task of philosophy is not to create new ideas or form a new theory, but to represent the things which we have already known and understand them in a new way by describing what are already before our eyes and what happen in our everyday lives. Describing what has already been there should be the way to solve philosophical problems, not by explanation and developing new theories. The problems of philosophy are solved when the problems no longer bother us and disappear completely.

Philosophical problems do not usually arise in our practical life until language is used beyond the actual use in our everyday life. Wittgenstein says, “When philosophers use a word and search for its meaning, one must always ask oneself: Is this word ever really used this way in the language for which it has been created?” (Mercer 2002, p. 315). The problems of philosophy come when a language is used and considered apart from its normal grammar. Language is designed to be used by human beings in their everyday communication to have an idle chat, to share their feelings, and so on. But, when it is used beyond its normal usage philosophical problems arise. For example, searching for the essence, if we ask what is the essence of happiness? What is perfect? What is time? And so on; we are using language outside the normal everyday use of language. Wittgenstein called such uses, beyond their normal usage, ‘the metaphysical use of language’. The disentanglement of language from this metaphysical use is the task of philosophy.

Wittgenstein (2010) opens the *Philosophical Investigations* with quotations from Augustine’s *Confession*, where Augustine describes how we learn and understand a language. In the passage Augustine states that human beings are born with a capacity to think that they have a mind in which there are wishes, thoughts, desires, etc., and are ready to have an interaction with the outside world as soon as they have the medium to communicate. He presumes that there are already certain ideas and wishes which only need a language to communicate. Wittgenstein’s description of language is focused on this topic of the description of language given by Augustine, and we may call it a criticism on Augustine’s theory of language. According to the explanation given by Augustine, the learning of language is made merely through ostensive definition and the meaning of an expression can be taught by pointing to the object (Ando1994). Wittgenstein does not deny that this kind of language exists, “Augustine really does describe a calculus; it just that not everything that we call language is in this calculus” (Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 57). Augustine presents an incomplete description of language where language always stands for something. This is one of the problems of philosophy where language is assumed to stand for something and that we can always point to the thing which it stands for. This is also the reason why Wittgenstein discarded the idea of his previous ideas in the *Tractatus* (2013) where he believes that propositions and states of affairs are always standing side by side. Wittgenstein developed the new conception of language

by introducing and using new concepts like ‘meaning in use’, ‘Language-game’, and ‘form of life’. These terms are closely connected concepts where one cannot be talked about while excluding the others. In the ensuing paragraphs I will talk about these concepts and try to bring out their significance for this new concept of language.

WITTGENSTEIN AND LANGUAGE-GAME

The term language-game is used to understand the nature of language as an activity (Ribes-Iñesta 2006). Wittgenstein names different varieties of language-game and the different activities which we do by using a language. They are: Giving orders, and acting on them, describing an object by its appearances, or by its measurement, constructing an object from a description (a drawing), reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the result of an experiment in tables and diagrams, making up a story; and reading one, acting in a play, singing rounds, guessing riddles, cracking a joke; telling one, solving a problem in applied arithmetic, translating from one language into another; requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying (Wittgenstein, 2010). It can be seen here that everything we do by using a language is called language- game. The varieties of language are different functions of language and the different things we can do with a language. Language functions in different ways and the learning of how to use language is not confined to the learning of attaching names to things. Augustine’s conception of language learning is only a preparation for using a word (Wittgenstein, 2010). The word ‘red’ is not a move in a game, it is just a preparation to describe something is red or not red. The naming of the word ‘red’ is not a move in a game yet (Wittgenstein, 2010). This exercise has deeper implications, but before going in detail with that implication I will continue with the idea of language-game.

Wittgenstein asks us to imagine what we can do with language other than naming a thing. To show this he uses the metaphor of ‘tools in a toolbox’ (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 11). The function of language is like a tool in a toolbox where different tools function in different ways. It is also like looking inside a locomotive cabin where there are different handles which look similar, but their functions are different (Wittgenstein, 2010). The difference between words are a difference in the way they function, which can be as diverse as lines in a map which can mean borders, meridians, streets, strata-lines, letters. But, these different functions do not have one thing in common by which we can label them as tools or handles or lines. Likewise, words do not always signify something, signifying something cannot be taken as the common property of the function of language. To explain the functions of language Wittgenstein uses the concept of ‘family resemblance’. He explains it like this:

‘Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common by virtue of which we use the same word for all – but there are many

different kinds of *affinity* between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages”...I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblance”; for the various resemblances between members of a family – build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth – overlap and crisscross in the same way. – And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family’ (Wittgenstein, 2010 pp. 65 & 67).

Family resemblance is the idea that all the members in the family do not have the same build, temperament, etc. But their resemblance lies in the network of overlapping and crisscrossing of similar characteristics.

This family resemblance concept can be extended, not only as Wittgenstein used to describe language-game (Nyström 2005). How Wittgenstein used the family resemblance is a ‘cluster concept’ where similarities in nature are overlapping and crisscrossing. When we look at a family they usually have the same biological blood line, and there might also be certain resemblances between them. However, who will be members in the family cannot be known in advance. It is true that the descendants will be members. But, people from outside can join them too in future; there can also be an adopted member who does not share the same similarities as the other members. The idea of different kind of family resemblance can also be seen in Wittgenstein’s remark; ‘Spengler could be better understood if he said: I am *comparing* different cultural epochs with the lives of family; within a family there is a family resemblance, though you will also find a resemblance between members of different families; family resemblance differs from other sort of resemblance in such and such ways, etc.’ (DeAngelis 2012, p. 17). Here, there are two uses of resemblance, the first one is resemblance between the same family and the second is the similarities between different families. Do the different similarities have any connection with what he said about ‘shared human behaviour’ (Wittgenstein, 2010, 206) and ‘form of life’? I will not pursue this one further here but will come to it later in the work.

Like a game, language is also bounded by rules. But, following a rule in language is not like proceeding in a strict formula. This clarification has come out in the course of the idea of the regulation of the use of word. What is the exact meaning of a game? Where do we draw the boundaries to what we can call a game? Wittgenstein’s answer is that, ‘We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 69). He takes the example of tennis where there is no exact rule about how high and how hard one can hit the ball, but we still call it a game and it is bounded by rules (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 68). This is one of Wittgenstein tactic to get free from the calculus concept of language. He brings up the playing of ball game: ‘We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball like this: starting various existing games, but playing several without finishing them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one

another with the ball, throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing ball-game and therefore are following definite rules at every throw. And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them – as we go along (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 83). Looking for the exact rule is same as looking for the essence of a word, like, what exactly does language mean. Wittgenstein tells us that there is no such thing as what a word means or the strict rule by means of which every move is considered in a game.

The calculus concept of language presupposes that word always stands for something substantive and that language has an essence which it really means. But, it is rather different. Wittgenstein expressed the meaning of words this way: For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” – though not for *all* – this word can be explained this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language (Van Heijenoort 1967). Language is used in the everyday life different from the way they are used in philosophy. Sentences like ‘Five red apples’ when used for shopping there is hardly any confusion regarding the meaning, but the problem starts when the meaning of the word like ‘five’ are considered independently of its use. The meaning of ‘five’ is never confusing for a language user in their everyday life, and it hardly creates a confusion except when the essence of it is surveyed in philosophy. The meaning of a word lies in the way they are used in our everyday lives and learning of different words like “five” and “apples” are different ways of learning. In the case of “apple” one can point to an apple, but in the case of “red” or “five” there is nothing which they stand for independently. They are used to say, “Something is red” or “There are five objects”.

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE

Philosophical problems arise when the meaning of words is considered out of context. The context of the meaning of a language is in the everyday lives. The context of the meaning of the language does not mean that the word like ‘five’ has different sets of meaning according to different circumstances. What it says is that ‘five’ has meaning only in the context of human everyday language and the meaning is the way is used. The concern here is that when meaning is considered outside of the context it leads to philosophical problems and confusions. Wittgenstein says, ‘Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analysing, the meaning of words. But, let’s not forget that a word hasn’t got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word *really* means’ (Ronen 2002, p. 47). There is nothing like what a word really means except what is given to it and used by human beings. So, analysis and investigation of the meaning of words should be in the context where these words are used.

Malinowski (1935) also makes similar observation regarding the relationship

between the meaning and its use. He emphasizes the importance of the relationship between an expression and the context in which it is used. He says that the meaning of a word must not be contemplated on its own, but from its function with reference to the given society. Language is used only within the context of society and understood in the background where one was brought up. Language is rooted in a culture where it is used, and culture can in turn be understood within the functioning of language. He also mentions that he reached these conclusions from “an example in which language is used by people engaged in practical work, in which utterances are embedded in action” (Ogden & Richards 1925, pp. 312). Language is context bound and it is exercised by people within a society, and the meaning is rooted in its use. When we say the meaning of an expression is in its use and depends on the context in which it is used, it also means that there are different uses and contexts in different fields like religion, art, laws, science etc., not only in different society or culture. The meaning of the word ‘good’ is different in each context. The word ‘good’ does not have a meaning in isolation; the meaning is in the context of life. Wittgenstein used the concept language-game to emphasize that speaking a language is a form of life (Arjoranta 2014), and ‘to imagine language is to imagine a form of life’ (Davidson & Smith 1999). It can also be said that his conception of language presupposes the idea of form of life. This expression points towards the fact that the activities of language are connected with form of life and language represents this form of life. Cavell⁴ made a distinction between form of life in two, horizontal or anthropological sense and vertical or biological sense. The horizontal sense is the biological and physiological form which every human being shared and the difference between normal human being and other animal or animal behaviour. These can be hunger, fear, the changing of season, the facts of the physical world and so on. The horizontal sense is closer to what Wittgenstein called the ‘shared human behaviour’ (Arjoranta 2014). The vertical sense is the life form shared within a society which might not be shared by others, it is social. There can be different forms of life for each society which they might or might not share. Looking in this way it can be said that language is intertwined with culture and nature.

The biological form or the horizontal can be extended into the objective enquiries which human beings shared among themselves which is also manifested in the modern scientific world which can be extended to the technological advancement of our contemporary world. There is sharable form of life between human beings which are not social in nature. I will extend this biological nature with the nature of the world which can be investigated by using scientific method. The scientific method of examining the physical world is the system which everyone can share, and where one can have a false science or reasoning. I will include the scientific way of looking at the physical world in the horizontal sense of form of life, which actually means the facts of nature which can be accepted by using the same scientific paradigm.

WITTGENSTEIN: LANGUAGE IS INTERTWINED WITH FORM OF LIFE

The meaning of our language is intertwined with form of life, it cannot be considered apart from it. In this sense, words have meaning only in a particular form of life. Using a language is communal activities and the meaning is also determined within a community. Using a language and meaning something by it is possible because of agreement within a society. But, this agreement is not an agreement in opinion, but rather in form of life (Laugier 2015). The agreement is not a decision based on opinion, but rather an agreement to do the same thing or act in the same way by observing the same form of life. The agreement in language is not based on philosophical speculations or scientific findings. The facts of nature provide the possibility of agreement in language. The concept of measurement is possible because of the nature of things, the fact that object does not change their size all the time is connected with the concept of measurement, if objects change their size frequently our rules of measurement will be different, or it might not exist at all (Shotter 1996). The concept of language and the meaning of our words are guided by rules, they are rule governed. Wittgenstein talks about the connection of meaning and rule in this way; ‘A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language. That is why there exists a correspondence between the concept of ‘rule’ and ‘learning’ (Garver 1990). Elsewhere, he says, the meaning of word is constituted by the rules of its employment (Laugier 2015). So, learning a language and knowing their meaning requires following a rule. To know how to use a language means to know how to apply these rules.

Wittgenstein is against the idea that understanding is a mental process (Garver 1990). Understanding a language is not mental goings-on. Knowing how to use a word and understanding are similar in that both are abilities to follow certain rules. In Wittgenstein’s words, ‘The grammar of the word “know” is evidently closely related to the grammar of the words “can”, “is able to”. Also, closely related to that of the word “understand” (De Mesel 2018, p. 53). It does not have a starting point and end point like mental states, for example, pain; pain has duration, starting point and an end. Knowing and understanding a language is not a mental experience which one has inside one’s head, but an ability. One’s understanding of a game of chess is judged by one’s ability to play when one is playing the actual game. This understanding of language and following a rule is possible only if there are rules and an established criterion to distinguish right from wrong rule-following (Grimm 2018). For Wittgenstein, ‘To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs*. So, to understand a language means to master a custom and usage which were established. To understand a language, one must follow the established rules. It is not possible for one to follow a rule only once, because this rule is intertwined with his everyday life. Wittgenstein further states: ‘to *think* one is

following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that is why it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately'; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it' (Azzouni 2017). Private rule following is not possible because everyone will be able to make up their own rules and follow this rule privately which cannot be called language. There will not be regularity and no criteria of correctness.

As there can be no private rule following, there can also be no private language. Private language is the language in which only one can have private words or language regarding one's thoughts and sensation which others cannot understand (Grimm 2018). Our language is connected to our form of life and the sensation language can be shared with each other because of our form of life. Wittgenstein questions if our form of life were different: "What would be like if human beings did not manifest their pains (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'toothache'" (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 257). The language we use and the way we use them presuppose a shared behaviour. Our form of life has set a stage for our language. One cannot have one's own private language about one's feelings and sensations; because not only that it would lead to a painful situation of our inability to communicate our feelings and sensations to others; but also, to the absurdity of communicating ourselves through a language that makes no distinction between right rule-following and wrong-rule following. The purpose of using a language is that people can share their feelings and express themselves in a community of life. Wittgenstein states this clearly: 'without language we cannot influence other human beings in such-and-such ways; cannot build roads and machines, and so on. And also: without the use of speech and writing, human being could not communicate' (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 491). He continues, 'To invent a language could mean to invent a device for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them)' (Wittgenstein, 2010, p. 492). As stated earlier, using a language is possible because of agreement in form of life. Agreement and form of life are preconditions of language-game. That is, people can agree on their correct use of the rules of their language and share the same form of life is crucial for language-game to exist.

When it is said that language use is possible because of certain form of life and facts of nature, it does not mean language represents reality as accepted by the calculus concept of language. The rules of grammar are arbitrary and autonomous (Wittgenstein 2010, p. 497). Unlike the rules of cooking, where there can be bad and good cooking depending on one's following of the rules, the rules of grammar work differently. If one does not follow the rules of chess, for example, one is not necessarily wrong, rather one is playing a different game (Jacquette 1990). The arbitrariness of grammar does not mean that we change and use whenever and whatever we like. It rather means that grammar is not answerable to what things really are. It cannot be said that our number system and colour system reside in the number

or colour (Lugg 2015). It does not explain or show the meaning of what things are in reality. In this way they are also autonomous, it is answerable only to its rules. The truth or falsity of our grammar is dependent only on the rules of its usage. The use of king in a game of chess is right or wrong only within that system. The function of a king in a certain country does not have anything to do with the function of king in a chess, it does not determine the correctness of the rule. The connection between them is only family-resemblance. It does not mean that the use of the word “tree” does not mean that tree does not need to exist for there to be the use of “tree”. It is like the use of the word “tree” is guided by grammar. Grammar does not tell us whether there is tree or not, and it is not responsible. They are arbitrary and autonomous also means that they cannot be said to be true or false, right or wrong, to how things really are. They just make the function of language possible in a certain way.

Wittgenstein replaces the calculus concept of language with the anthropological concept (Mulligan 1991). This anthropological concept does not give priority to the notions of truth, truth-condition, representation, and force, but rather to those of use, language-game, understanding, and communication (Mulligan 1991). The anthropological conception of language puts the meaning of word as they are used within a language-game, not in isolation from human activity. The meaning of a sentence is outside, rather than inside the users, in the sense that what one thinks or makes up does not comprise the meaning, but it is what one does and how one employs the words and sentences that matters. How one employs a language is guided by the custom of usage within a language-game. The customs and rules of language-games are not fixed and rigid. They are liable to change according to the demand and need of the game in which they are played. A single word cannot be understood and does not have a meaning in isolation from the whole language-game where they are employed. Meaning acquires their sense in the context of a human life. In this new concept of language, the meaning of language is intertwined with life. The meaning cannot be considered apart from the life where they are used. Language does not just represent reality, yet they are in conformity with nature. The meaning does not lie in the nature of things or in the user. The meaning of language can be found in the form of life where they are used. Without these forms of life they are dead signs. They have meaning only within a particular language-game. Understanding the complicated system requires mastery of an established technique; knowing how to apply the rules in time.

Language and the life cannot be separated from each other. Wittgenstein (2010) declares, ‘To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life’ (p. 19). In this sense it can be said that form of life is the culture which gives language its meaning. The resemblance between culture and form of life comes out explicitly in the *The Blue and Brown Books* where he equates imagining a language with imagining culture (Wienpahl 1972). Language is situated in culture, and language also reflects

culture. Wittgenstein writes: ‘We could say people’s concepts show what matters to them and what doesn’t’ (Savickey 2015, p.75). Language and its concept reflect what a culture considered important and unimportant. The name of a thing they give and the concept that comes along with it show the nature of their culture. Some culture might not have the concept of “adultery”. A culture which does not have the concept of adultery means that sex outside a relationship is not considered a taboo or sin. It does not mean that those sexual activities do not exist. Here, “adultery” does not just mean sexual activity outside marriage, but also the immoral concept which comes along with it. Different cultures will have different bearing to the meaning of language and words (Nzuanke et al., 2019). There are facts of nature which human beings share with each other. Let us take the example of “death”. It is a fact that all human beings will die one day. All cultures might have the word for death, the concept that one’s biological life is over. But, here the meaning and what emotional bearing people have on death can be different depending on the culture. Thus, the meaning of “death” cannot be bereft of its emotional and cultural bearing.

From this understanding of language and its relationship with culture we may derive the following four points which can be interpreted as the four features of culture in accordance with the relationship between language and culture from a Wittgensteinian perspective. First, following Geertz, we can say that culture is public because meaning is public. Culture has meaning only as a practice within a society. Knowing the meaning and understanding what it means to say or do is knowing how to follow the rules of a culture (Nwobu 2018). Following rules is following an established sign which others have followed before. For customs and symbols to mean anything there has to be an agreement regarding its connotation. For culture to have any influence and meaning, it has to be a practice where the members can understand each other’s practice and have an agreement in what they do (Nzuanke & Ajimase 2014). Culture is not an idea or knowledge which is present in the mind and heart of its members. Culture is not a practice which the members commit to memorise the rules and practices in their memory. Having a culture rather means that one masters the practices and knows the values of the practices. This knowledge of practice and value is shown in their action and everyday lives. Which means one’s culture is not what one thinks or stores in one’s memory, but the way one leads one’s lives. So, when understanding a culture, one has to understand the gestures and action along with its implications and know how to use these gestures and action in the real world. To understand a culture means to master the technique of how the signs and symbols work. Culture is practice and action which carries meaning. Shaking a hand or kissing the cheeks of others is not greeting unless one knows the implications of it. The shaking of a hand is a symbol of greeting within a culture. Shaking hand with others does not have any ontological status or any independent reality apart from the meaning given by human. To shake a hand, one has to know what it means to shake a hand,

what it means within a culture where it is performed. Shaking a hand without the meaning given by culture is like a dead sign. It is just an action of holding each other's hand. The gesture as a greeting becomes meaningful only when it is actually used as a sign of greetings. Meaning or intending something else other than the established intention when shaking other's hand is senseless, it loses the point of shaking hand. But, it does not mean that the meaning is fixed, but it is the meaning which is agreed upon that can be counted as meaningful. It will be pointless to shake hand without intending what it means. As Wittgenstein (2010) says, 'The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a *point*' (p. 564).

Culture is also public in the sense that the practice and value are not private, that it can be understood and known only by the members but not by an outsider. It is true that all the actions and gestures within a culture cannot be easily understood from outside, and they have their own meaning within that particular system. Culture is not a closed system with a definite boundary where we can separate one culture from the other with a specific practice of their own. There are practices and values which are shared between different cultures in different ways. Some might share their religion, food, and so on. There might not be one thing which every culture has shared, but in one way or another different cultures share their values and practices, like a family resemblance. This is one way in which different cultures can understand each other, by sharing practices.

How does a person from a culture who does not have the concept of greetings can understand the concept of greetings by shaking hands? Let us say shaking hands means to say "Hello" and "Goodbye" when one is going out and coming back to their home town or village. An outsider sees that they are shaking their hands but does not know what it means because he does not have the concept of greetings. Does it mean that these people never leave their places and come back to their place? Maybe they never go out of their place where they have to say "Hello" or "Goodbye". So, how will this outsider understand this concept of greetings? First of all, he has to understand that these people have a different way of life where greeting is an important practice. Can he learn this concept like a child learns its elder's concepts? Wittgenstein's answer is that humans have a shared form of behaviour and interpretation of an unknown language can be carried out with reference to that shared form of behavior. This is the form of life which all human beings share with each other, our biological and physiological nature. But, greeting is a cultural activity, and what reference does the outsider have in order to understand it? The answer is that an outsider might not share the practice as the members do, but it does not mean that it is not possible to understand the practice. Wittgenstein writes: 'One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country's language. One does not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can't find

our feet with them' (Gebauer 2017, p. 325). Here, we have another sense of understanding, which means mastering a technique. Let us say, the outsider can understand the meaning of shaking hand as a greeting but cannot do this as the members do. The implications here is that shaking hands carries a lot of concepts, it can mean "nice to meet you", "How do you do?" and so on. It can mean that the outsider is not capable of meaning and distinguishing all these meanings of hand shaking. Complete mastering is not possible within a short time, but it does not mean that understanding is not possible. Knowing what a cultural practice is possible for an outsider.

There can be two senses of public nature of culture: Culture is not in the mind of the member and it is not totally hidden from an outsider. In the words of Geertz⁸, the public nature of culture implies, 'debate within anthropology as to whether culture is "subjective" or "objective", together with the mutual exchange of intellectual insults ("idealist!" – "materialist!"; "mentalist!" – "behaviourist!"; "impressionist!" – "positivist!") which accompanies it, is wholly misconceived. Once human behaviour is seen as symbolic action – action which, like phonation in speech, pigment in painting, line in writing, or sonance in music, signifies – the question as to whether culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, or even the two somehow mixed together, loses sense'. When culture is seen as a practice in the social sphere many philosophical problems surrounding it disappear. Wittgenstein aims at it and has quite successfully invoked the public nature of meaning, language, understanding and even culture. Second, culture is a set of meaningful activities. Culture is not the norms which make up and guide the principles of the practice. Culture is the actual activity which is guided by these norms. Like the rules of language, understanding these norms are necessary to understand a culture. But knowing these norms does not mean understanding a culture. Understanding means knowing how to act according to these norms.

The physiological movement of the body and the body posture is translated into a meaningful activity within a culture. The movement of the hand may be a physical activity, but it can mean different things depending on the place where the activity takes place. When people shake hands the physical movement of the hand is translated into greetings. The physical movement becomes insignificant, the greeting takes its place. For this translation to happen the members have to master a technique of shaking hands as greetings. There are books on culture where the list of those activities and norms are given. It is also possible to talk about different cultures and their practices. One can read a book about culture and apply that in real life. Can an action which imitates what is written in a book be called cultural activity? Is it possible to call that action meaningful? We can compare this to mastering the rules of addition. It is not possible to say that a child who knows just how to add "1+1" masters the rules of addition. The child should be able to add different numbers in different situations to

be considered mastering the rules of addition. In cultural practice also, one cannot be considered a member of a culture just because one reads and acts out according to what is written in the book. One has to be able to perform several meaningful actions when it's needed, not only once in one's lifetime. So, one has to be able to perform different meaningful activities to be called a member of a culture. Even though culture is a set of meaningful activities, it cannot be said that it is inside a box where the items are arranged in a proper order. As has been said before the set is not a group where exact classification can be made. Different cultures cannot be compared with different set of activities with definite boundaries. It is not possible to separate one set of practice from another set of practice to make distinction between cultures. The set of activities of one culture may contain an activity which is also present in another culture. Two cultures may have overlapping activities.

One does not necessarily need to master or practice all the activities to become a legitimate member of a culture. A mathematician is not called a mathematician because of his ability to master all the fields of mathematics. One can be called a mathematician by mastering certain fields of mathematics, or even one field. But, one field of mathematics does not necessarily exclude the other fields, a number theorist needs to have knowledge on some other fields of mathematics. Members in a church can have different functions within the established institution which can be varied. But, a member is not excluded because he does not perform some activities. Having a culture is not mastering all the activities which are included in a culture, performing and mastering certain activities one can become a member of a cultural group. Third, culture is autonomous. Culture is autonomous in the sense that the rules and activities are accountable only within the culture itself. The activities can be right or wrong only within that system. The meaning of the activities and practices should be considered only within the culture. This autonomy does not mean that all cultures are right in their own way and their epistemic system are all valid (Hacker 2001). Here, we need to distinguish between the social form of life and the biological form of life. The social form of life or the social form of culture is the autonomous system.

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein does not accept that all cultural practices are right in their own way. Textual evidences can be found in "On Certainty" and "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough". Culture might not be meaningful to the outsider or sometimes it may look unwise. The outsider could judge from his culture, but this judgments does not need to be considered as true or false. Cultures have their own systems standards of judging things as good or bad, correct or incorrect, and so on. The autonomy of culture also means that the knowledge claim and world view of a culture are considered and tested only within that culture where these claims and views are made. The authority of culture can be claimed only within the system, and the meaningfulness can be

considered only within that system. This idea of autonomy can be interpreted as an evidence of relativism. Whether one can imply relativism from autonomy of culture. Fourth, culture is inherited. Culture is not an activity and values which anyone can pick up and change when they want. Culture is inherited by a child by believing his elders. It is similar with the situation where one cannot choose their ancestors. A child shares the culture of his elders by following their practices and values. One does not grow up and out of nowhere decides to make up a culture or pick any culture one likes. Making up one's own culture is not possible as we can see in the public nature of culture. The other reason is that one needs a background and a member to share those values and activities. One always thinks and acts against an established background. Culture is the background against which one thinks and acts. It is not that there cannot be thinking and action without culture, but culture is needed for meaningful action and thinking. Our actions and beliefs have meaning by using the established culture as their background.

Mastering of a culture needs time and training in society. It is not an idea or practice which is picked up like learning a mathematical formula or a particular theory. One is drilled and taught every day, by believing one's elder and imitating others. Mastering a culture is not to learn a few rules of certain practices but knowing how to use them in one's everyday life. But, it is not known at what point in life one can master a cultural practice; whether an adult can master another culture, or one can only master a culture one inherits? Whether one can totally abandon one's culture and pick up another culture is a hard question to answer.

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